Not for China U.S. restricts foreign capital from entering quantum computing
Despite the very early stages of quantum computing, the U.S. government has adopted a two-pronged strategy of blocking it. In addition to banning the sale of quantum computing to countries like China and Russia, it is now considering restricting foreign capital from entering the U.S. quantum computing sector, though this time without mentioning any specific country.
The "Order to Ensure Careful Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States" [1], signed by Biden last week, mentions that foreign investments involving "special countries" may pose national security risks. It does not specify what the special countries are.
A senior Biden administration official said [2], "There is nothing in this order or CFIUS that is specific to China."
An important one is this：
The Commission shall consider, as appropriate, the impact of covered transactions on supply chain resilience and security within and outside the defense industrial base, i.e., manufacturing capabilities, services, critical mineral resources, or technologies critical to national security, including: microelectronics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, quantum computing, advanced clean energy (e.g., battery storage and hydrogen), climate adaptation technologies, critical materials (e.g., lithium and rare earth elements ), elements of the agro-industrial base that have implications for food security, and so on.
The Commission shall consider national security requirements, taking into account the following factors, as appropriate.
(i) While foreign investment can in many cases help promote domestic innovation, it is important to protect U.S. technological leadership by addressing the risks posed by foreign investors who may take actions that could harm U.S. national security as a result of the transaction, as well as determining whether such investors have relevant third-party relationships that could lead to transactions that pose such threats.
(ii) The Commission shall consider, as appropriate, whether the covered transaction involves manufacturing capabilities, services, critical mineral resources, or technologies critical to U.S. technological leadership as well as national security, such as microelectronics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, quantum computing, advanced clean energy, and climate adaptation technologies. The Commission shall also consider, as appropriate, relevant third-party relationships that could result in transactions that threaten to harm U.S. national security.
(iii)The Commission shall consider, as appropriate, whether the covered transactions could reasonably lead to future technological advances and applications that could harm national security.
(iv) The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), in consultation with the other members of the Committee, shall periodically publish a list of technology sectors. This list assesses U.S. technology leadership in areas relevant to national security. oSTP should draw on the results of other U.S. government efforts, as appropriate, to identify technology sectors that are critical to U.S. technology leadership. The Committee should consider the list described in this subsection, as appropriate.
Although China is not mentioned, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has been an important tool in recent years to discourage Chinese investment in critical areas in the United States.
During the Trump administration, CFIUS ordered China's ByteHop to divest TikTok's U.S. operations. Reuters reported in March that TikTok was close to reaching a deal with Oracle to store U.S. users' information without ByteTok's access, hoping to address U.S. regulators' concerns about the integrity of TikTok's data.
The U.S. Treasury Department said in a report last month that the number of Chinese investors applying for U.S. regulatory approval to acquire shares in U.S. companies roughly doubled last year.
